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Commissioner responsible for competition policy 
In 1994 the Commission placed two objec-
tives at the heart of its enforcement of com-
petition policy: consumer protection on the 
one hand, and employment and competitive-
ness on the other. 
In the final analysis, all the various elements 
that make up the Community's competition 
policy have the aim of protecting EU citi-
zens: citizens as consumers, as employees 
and employers, and as shareholders. Thus, 
for example, agreements fixing prices and 
quotas, or artificially dividing the Commu-
nity with the objective of preventing compe-
tition, result in increased prices and reduced 
choice for the consumer. Indeed, such agree-
ments prejudice the basic aims of the Com-
munity in establishing the common market 
in the first place: a wider market and more 
choice. The same holds true where com-
panies abuse a dominant position by, for 
example, artificially excluding competitors. 
These reasons alone would provide every 
justification for vigorously combating such 
practices. 
But such practices also harm our industry. 
Artificially limiting competition between 
Community firms means that they will 
become isolated from exactly those pres-
sures that lead them to innovate, both in 
terms of product development, and with 
respect to the introduction of more efficient 
production processes. They also lead to 
more expensive raw materials and compo-
nents for the Community firms that buy 
from these producers. In today's market 
place, Community industry simply cannot 
afford this luxury. In the long term, such 
practices will lead to a loss of competitive-
ness and, in an ever-globalizing market-
place, the loss of jobs. 
In 1994, therefore, more cartel decisions 
were taken than ever before, in the cement, 
steel beams and cartonboard sectors, and 
record fines were imposed. A prohibition 
decision was also adopted in a case regard-
ing restraints on parallel trade between 
Member States. In other cases, the Commis-
sion prohibited companies from abusing 
their dominant positions by artificially 
attempting to exclude competitors from the 
market. 
Of course, this does not mean that the focus-
ing of our competition policy results in all 
agreements between competitors being pro-
hibited. It means, rather, a clear line being 
drawn between those that prejudice the 
interests of Community citizens and those 
that are beneficial in overall terms. It then 
requires us to take resolute action against the 
former and efficiently approve the latter. 
Indeed, the goals of growth, competitiveness 
and employment have led the Commission 
to take a positive approach to many agree-
ments between companies in 1994: those 
which help them to increase their competi-
tiveness by collaborating closely with their 
competitors, distributors or licensees. The 
Commission fully recognizes and accepts 
that in many agreements -joint research and 
development or joint production, for exam-
ple - such collaborative arrangements are 
vital to enable our companies to compete 
effectively. While such agreements will not 
get a carte blanche from the Commission -
they may not result, for example, in 
price-fixing or the division of the Communi-
ty into completely protected territories -
they are viewed positively. This is reflected 
in the number of positive decisions adopted 
in 1994, more than in any previous year. 
Furthermore, while in 19 cases formal deci-sions were adopted involving such forms of 
collaboration, this statistic is only the tip of 
the iceberg. Many more such agreements 
notified to the Commission were quickly 
and effectively approved by comfort letter -
in 1994 a total of 197 cases were dealt with 
by comfort letter, and many of these cases 
concerned such agreements. 
In the area of merger control, the Commissi-
on also successfully handled a record num-
ber of cases in 1994, up from 48 in 1993 to 
95 in 1994. In this area, the pursuance of the 
dual objectives of the protection of consu-
mers and citizens, and the maintenance of 
EU competitiveness can most clearly be 
seen. The Commission's central objective in 
carrying out its responsibilities under the 
Merger Regulation is to prevent the creation 
or strengthening of dominant positions. The 
fact that companies enjoying dominance will 
charge higher prices and invest less in 
research and development than companies 
facing active competition is well document-
ed. The Commission's approach, therefore, 
in this - as in previous years - plays a cen-
tral role in the achievement of our underly-
ing objective. 
The year saw a number of spectacular State 
aid decisions, particularly those relating to 
the restructuring of the steel industry, and of 
the public enterprises, Air France and Bull. 
However, the Commission also took more 
than 500 other decisions (excluding aid in 
agriculture, fisheries, transport and the coal 
industry) on individual cases or on aid 
schemes providing assistance for firms; it 
adopted guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring firms in difficulty, the 
main principles of which were upheld by the 
Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties in a judgment delivered in September; it 
began consultations on draft guidelines on 
aid to employment and a revised version of 
the 1986 guidelines on State aid for research 
and development, and prepared the fourth 
survey on State aid in the Community, which 
will be published in 1995. The Commission 
also drew up a detailed manual of State aid 
procedures, which it adopted in December 
and which will also be published in 1995. 
In 1994 the Commission also devoted a sub-
stantial part of its resources to monitoring 
the conditions imposed in its decisions (not-
ably those relating to the restructuring of the 
steel industry and the large Italian public 
sector groups), examining the restructuring 
and privatization operations carried out by 
the Treuhandanstalt, and scrutinizing the 
annual reports on financial relationships 
between Member States and their large pub-
lic enterprises in the manufacturing sector. 
The Commission also worked closely with 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority, which is 
responsible for monitoring State aid in the 
EFTA countries, and prepared the way for 
the accession of three EFTA countries to the 
European Union, notably by examining the 
maps of the regions eligible for regional aid 
and by adopting a new regional aid eligibil-
ity criterion based on low population density 
so as to take account of the particular geo-
graphical characteristics of some of the new 
member countries. 
State aid, whatever its form and whatever 
the national, regional or local authority 
granting it, must be notified to the Commis-
sion and authorized by it before being imple-
mented. More than 10% of aid registered in 
1994 did not comply with this rule, which is 
essential in ensuring that State aid is trans-
parent and, in particular, in preventing aid 
that is incompatible with the common mar-
ket from adversely affecting competition. To 
encourage strict compliance with this rule, 
which is at present the only State aid rule 
that has direct effect before national courts, 
the Commission is drawing up two notices, 
one on cooperation with national courts 
and the other on the recovery of aid dis-
bursed without awaiting the Commission's 
approval. 
Finally, significant progress was once again 
made in 1994 in liberalizing sectors previ-
ously the exclusive preserve of State monop-
olies. The telecommunications sector merits 
special mention here. This sector is of cru-
cial importance for the Community. If our INTRODUCTION BY KAREL VAN MIERT 
telecommunications infrastructure is less 
competitive than that in other parts of the 
world, this will not only lead to higher pric-
es and poorer service for consumers, but will 
also impact on the competitiveness of other 
EU industries that rely on cheap and effec-
tive communications as key ingredients for 
their success. Furthermore, experience else-
where in the world has demonstrated that 
following liberalization the telecommunica-
tions sector grows rapidly as consumers take 
advantage of the wider choice of products 
that quickly become available, and the lower 
prices. For many years the Community has 
lagged behind its major rivals in opening up 
its telecommunications industry to open and 
free competition. With the measures now 
planned, which will enter into force over the 
coming years, this is no longer the case, and 
I believe that, through the common action of 
the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council, we have now laid the foundations 
for a truly competitive European telecom-
munications industry which will play a lead-
ing worldwide role. Furthermore, the man-
ner in which the Community has adopted the 
measures necessary to achieve these goals -
the phased opening-up of services to free 
competition - is one that has enabled us to 
ensure that the measures have not, and will 
not, prejudice the basic precondition for lib-
eralization: the continuation of a universal 
service - all Community citizens must con-
tinue to receive a quality telephone service 
at reasonable prices. 
Thus, applying these objectives to all our 
activities has produced many positive 
results, both in terms of the number of deci-
sions taken and, more importantly, in terms 
of quality. The Commission's continuing 
commitment to provide a service of the 
highest quality, first and foremost to consu-
mers but also to European industry, provides 
an excellent foundation for us to meet the 
important and difficult challenges that will 
face us over the coming years. CONTENTS 
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Prohibition decisions  The steel beams cartel 
Cartels 
Prohibitions were adopted against three 
major Europe-wide cartels in 1994, more 
than in any previous year. In addition, high-
er fines were imposed than ever before. 
These statistics give rise to some positive 
and some negative messages. On the posi-
tive side, they demonstrate the Com-
mission's ability to detect and investigate 
effectively such agreements, notwithstand-
ing their clandestine nature. They also dem-
onstrate a determination on the part of the 
Commission to persuade industry that it is 
not rational to continue to engage in cartels. 
On the other hand, the fact that such long-
standing and industry-wide cartels were 
brought to light provides a strong indication 
that European industry has not yet complete-
ly recognized that such practices are out of 
date and illegal, and must be abandoned. 
Equally, the Commission is well aware that 
the imposition of high fines will have two 
effects. Most importantly, it will convince 
some companies to abandon existing cartels 
and deter others from setting up new ones. 
However, it will also lead those who contin-
ue to engage in such practices to make even 
greater efforts to avoid detection. With the 
ever-increasing use of computers, the detec-
tion of cartels is becoming more and more 
complicated. Experience in 1994 has shown, 
however, that the powers of inspection avail-
able to the Commission make detection pos-
sible, and the Commission must ensure that 
this will remain the case. In order to meet 
these challenges, and to increase further the 
Commission's activity in this area, it was 
decided in 1994 to set up a specialized cartel 
unit whose sole task will be the detection of 
cartels and the preparation of decisions lead-
ing to their prohibition and fining. Directo-
rates B, C and D of the Directorate-General 
for Competition (DG IV) will also continue 
to deal actively with such matters. The Com-
mission's intention in establishing this new 
unit is, therefore, to increase its cartel activ-
ity and to continue to develop and refine its 
detection and prosecution skills. 
In 1991 the Commission carried out suiprise 
inspections at a number of companies that 
manufactured and/or distributed steel beams 
in the Community. On the basis of the docu-
ments copied during these inspections, and 
further evidence obtained by letter, it was 
confirmed that a cartel had been operating 
since 1984 (the Commission has the right to 
require companies to reply to questions 
addressed to them; fines can be imposed if 
they fail to reply, or do so incompletely or 
incorrectly). The companies involved had 
agreed to fix prices and quotas, and regular-
ly exchanged a wide variety of what would 
normally be considered highly confidential 
information in order to ensure that the cartel 
operated effectively. In all, 17 companies 
were involved in the agreement, which was 
implemented via Eurofer, the European steel 
industry association. 
Fines totalling ECU 104.4 million were 
imposed. When deciding on the amounts of 
the fines, the Commission took account not 
only of the gravity and duration of the 
infringements, but also the estimated profit 
that the companies would have received 
from the operation of the cartel and the fact 
that there had been a deep crisis in the indus-
try between 1980 and 1988. For this period, 
no fine was imposed. 
The cartonboard cartel 
Following complaints from British and 
French trade associations of purchasers of 
cartonboard, the Commission carried out 16 
different but simultaneous surprise inspec-
tions involving over 40 inspectors, made up 
of joint teams of DG IV officials and inspec-
tors from the Member States. These inspec-
tions, together with further information 
received in reply to numerous letters, con-
firmed the operation of a cartel involving 19 
companies covering the whole of the Euro-
pean cartonboard sector. The cartel consisted 
of agreeing periodic 'price initiatives' (con-
certed increases) to which all producers adhered. Furthermore, the main producers 
also reached a consensus on their respective 
market shares: they all realized that aggres-
sive attempts to gain market share would 
undermine the price initiatives which took 
place every six months. As a result of the 
cartel, list prices increased by an average of 
26% in real terms between 1988 and mid-
1991. Fines totalling ECU 132 million were 
imposed. In setting the fines, the Com-
mission took particular account of the fact 
that a number of companies cooperated with 
the Commission. Two companies voluntari-
ly provided information and documents 
which were important to the Commission's 
case at an early stage in the investigation, 
and received a very substantial reduction in 
the fine that would otherwise have been 
imposed. Smaller - yet still substantial -
reductions were given to companies which 
did not initially contest the essential facts of 
the Commission's case but did so only at a 
later stage in the proceedings. 
Transport sector cases 
Particular issues arise for the Commission 
when dealing with wide-ranging collabora-
tion agreements between competitors in the 
transport sector. It is important for EU citi-
zens that the Community has an integrated 
and efficient transport network. It is equally 
important that trans-European networks are 
developed quickly and effectively. These 
two priorities mean that in many cases such 
collaboration between transport companies 
is not only beneficial but also essential, and 
the Community therefore generally takes a 
positive approach to such agreements. This 
policy stance is reflected in the treatment of 
individual cases, where exemptions are 
granted to agreements that give rise to 
important restrictions of competition if they 
are necessary to enable competitors to 
provide the public with an integrated and 
efficient service. 
10 
Cement cartel 
In November the Commission adopted a 
decision imposing a total fine of ECU 248 
million on 23 cement producers, eight 
national cement associations and the Euro-
pean Cement Association. Following a large 
number of simultaneous surprise inspections 
throughout the Community, the Commission 
discovered a 'home market' cartel operating 
throughout the European Union. In essence, 
the companies agreed - via their national 
cement association - not to sell in one 
another's home market. A widespread 
exchange of information that would normal-
ly be considered company confidential took 
place to enable the cartel to function. Such 
practices, which have the sole objective of 
limiting competition between companies 
from the different Member States, frustrates 
the fundamental EU aim of the creation of 
the single market, and it should be no sur-
prise, therefore, that the total amount of 
fines imposed in this case was the highest to 
date. 
However, it is important to note that, when 
examining such matters, the Commission is 
very careful to ensure that each agreement 
does not afford such undertakings the pos-
sibility of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in ques-
tion. Thus, the Commission will not tolerate 
agreements in the shipping industry that aim 
to exclude competition between conference 
members and outsiders, thus effectively 
eliminating all competition on any given 
route. Nor will it be prepared to approve col-
laboration agreements in other transport sec-
tors, such as the air transport industry, which 
effectively exclude active competition on a 
given route. 
This latter approach also explains the Com-
mission's strict attitude towards conference 
agreements that go further than block 
exemption Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86. This Regulation already allows 
companies to group together and offer, 
de facto, a service at uniform prices, so it is 
not surprising that the Commission is reluc-
tant to approve collaboration that is wider in ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
scope than the Regulation permits. This 
approach is reflected in the decisions 
adopted in 1994 as well as in 1993. 
Trans-Atlantic Agreement 
The Trans-Atlantic Agreement (TAA), con-
cluded between 16 liner shipping compa-
nies, concerns the transport of containerized 
cargo between Northern Europe and the 
United States of America, a market in which 
the TAA parties enjoyed a market share of 
some 70%. 
Far Eastern Freight Conference 
The block exemption Regulation on liner 
conferences concerns only the transport of 
goods by sea. The Far Eastern Freight Con-
ference instituted rules enabling members to 
fix prices for door-to-door services, thus also 
including the transport of goods by land. 
Liner conferences receive favourable treat-
ment under the competition rules because 
they enable the members to offer a service 
which is of benefit to consumers. The agree-
ment failed to provide any joint inland activ-
ity which could produce benefits to consu-
mers. The agreement was therefore prohibit-
ed, and symbolic fines of ECU 10 000 per 
company were imposed. 
Following an unprecedented number of 
complaints, the Commission found that a 
number of the practices engaged in by the 
parties to the Agreement infringed the com-
petition rules. They neither fell within the 
scope of the block exemption on liner con-
ferences, nor merited individual exemption. 
The aspects of the TAA to which the Com-
mission objected were a two-tier price struc-
ture, the agreement on non-utilization of 
capacity and inland rate fixing. The two-tier 
pricing system enabled the conference to 
include within its structure companies that 
wish to charge lower prices than the confer-
ence members, and which would, in normal 
conference arrangements, be the main 'out-
siders' or competitors of the conference. The 
non-utilization of capacity has never been 
permitted under Community law, especially 
in conjunction with price-fixing. Agree-
ments on the non-utilization of capacity prov-
ide that all members of the conference only 
use a certain maximum percentage of avail-
able capacity for any given sailing. Remov-
ing vessels from service is cheaper, and pro-
vides savings for customers, but generates 
less income for the shipping companies. The 
TAA decision makes clear that the block 
exemption for liner conferences permits 
temporary adjustments in the amount of 
physical capacity made available (taking 
vessels temporarily out of service), but not 
capacity non-utilization agreements. 
Agreements preventing parallel trade 
Tretorn 
Community competition policy has always 
recognized that a vital part of many distribu-
tion or licensing systems is the allocation of 
exclusive territories to distributors or licen-
sees, and generally accepts not only exclu-
sivity clauses in such agreements, but also 
obligations on the distributor or licensee not 
to advertise or otherwise actively solicit cus-
tomers outside its allotted territory. How-
ever, the Commission and the European 
Courts have consistently maintained that 
agreements restricting parallel trade - pre-
venting distributors from selling to third par-
ties who wish to export the produce to 
another Member State - are illegal and will 
attract high fines. Such agreements, which 
have the effect of resealing borders that have 
been opened by the single market pro-
gramme, prevent citizens living in countries 
where prices are high from benefiting from 
low price imports. In 1994, the Commission 
adopted a decision in one such case, in 
which a tennis ball producer (Tretorn) pro-
hibited its exclusive distributors from selling 
for export, and took a number of measures to 
ensure that this obligation was complied 
with. Tretorn was fined ECU 600 000, and 
its distributors were each fined ECU 10 000.  11 12 
Agreements and practices prevent-
ing or limiting access to markets by 
competitors 
One of the Commission's main tasks in 
enforcing competition rules is to ensure that 
companies do not conclude agreements or, 
where they hold a dominant position, engage 
in unilateral practices, which have the effect 
of limiting the ability of other firms - usual-
ly those from other Member States taking 
advantage of the possibilities offered by the 
single market - to compete. Under Article 
85, such agreements may typically consist of 
networks of distribution agreements where-
by incumbent producers tie up all available 
distributors. Under Article 86, a dominant 
firm may, for example, attempt to prevent its 
customers from using different suppliers by 
means of loyalty rebates, or attempt to 
remove an existing competitor by predatory 
pricing. In 1994, two cases of particular 
importance were dealt with under Article 86, 
and one case, Carlsberg/Interbrew, was 
dealt with under both Articles 85 and 86. 
Microsoft 
Following a complaint from a software manu-
facturer, the Commission investigated 
whether Microsoft had abused an alleged 
dominant position in the market for PC oper-
ating systems by adopting software licensing 
arrangements which had the effect of 
excluding competitors. After investigating 
the complaint, the Commission was con-
cerned that the use of 'per-processor' and 
'per-system' licences (i.e. clauses requiring 
payment of a royalty on every computer pro-
duced by a PC manufacturer regardless of 
the actual number of computers sold with 
pre-installed Microsoft software), the dura-
tion of Microsoft's licence contracts and the 
use of 'minimum commitments' in these 
contracts had the effect of foreclosing the 
European market for such software. At the 
same time the United States antitrust author-
ities were investigating similar concerns. 
Microsoft consented to the exchange of 
information between the Commission and 
the US Department of Justice (DoJ) by 
waiving its right to secrecy with respect to 
both authorities. A number of contacts 
between DG IV and the DoJ then followed 
in which a coordinated approach to the case 
was prepared. This joint action was not 
taken in accordance with the 1991 Co-
operation Agreement between the European 
Commission and the US Government, as 
this Agreement does not permit such wide-
ranging information exchange in the absence 
of the authorization of the companies 
concerned. 
While the Commission was preparing a 
statement of objections, Microsoft indicated 
its willingness to reach a settlement with the 
authorities concerned. The Commission and 
the Department of Justice agreed to nego-
tiate jointly with Microsoft, and talks were 
held both in Brussels and Washington DC. 
These resulted in an undertaking from 
Microsoft to the Commission and the US 
authorities. The undertaking obtained by the 
Commission provides that Microsoft will 
not enter into licence contracts with a dura-
tion of more than one year, will not impose 
minimum commitments on licensees and 
will not use per-processor licences. Per-
system licences will be allowed only if 
licensees are clearly given the freedom to 
purchase non-Microsoft products. The 
undertaking will open up the market for 
operating system software to competition 
from existing suppliers and potential new 
entrants. 
HOV-SVZ/MCN 
Following investigations based on a com-
plaint, the Commission discovered that 
Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) charged compa-
nies using German ports less for equivalent 
rail services than those using Belgian or 
Dutch ports. It was also concluded that DB 
held a dominant position (as the monopoly 
provider of rail services in Germany) and 
had abused this position through its discrim-
inatory policy. This policy artificially 
encouraged companies to use German ports ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
and thus DB's services for the entire rail 
journey to German destinations, even if it 
would, in normal circumstances, be more 
economic (a lesser distance) to use Belgian 
or Dutch ports and the services of both the 
Belgian/Dutch and German railway compa-
nies. The Commission fined DB ECU 11 
million. The decision does not question the 
right of DB to act as a monopoly provider of 
rail transport services in Germany: it makes 
clear, however, that a legal monopoly cannot 
be used to favour the activities of associated 
companies at the expense of competitors. 
Carlsberg/Interbrew 
In 1989, Carlsberg, the largest Danish brew-
er, concluded an exclusive distribution 
agreement with Interbrew, the largest Bel-
gian brewer. Interbrew was given the ex-
clusive right to sell 'Carlsberg' and 'Tuborg' 
beer in Belgium and Luxembourg. The 
Commission objected to the agreement, as it 
effectively excluded competition between 
these two major European brewers for luxu-
ry 'pils' beer in a country where the licensee 
was in a predominant position. 
The Commission's action against the exclu-
sive arrangement between Carlsberg and 
Interbrew was in line with the conclusions of 
the 1991 EC beer review, which announced 
that licensing agreements between major 
breweries would be examined by the Com-
mission to see whether they were being used 
as vehicles for market-sharing or the control 
of imports. The Commission accepts that 
production and distribution agreements 
between breweries established in different 
Member States may benefit consumers. 
Such agreements may enable small special-
ized breweries to sell their products outside 
their domestic markets or they may provide 
a springboard for independent operations by 
a large brewery in another geographic mar-
ket. However, disadvantages in terms of 
competition must not outweigh such poten-
tial benefits. This is the case where an exclu-
sive right is granted to a domestic brewery 
which, as in the case of Interbrew, has a 
clearly predominant position on its own 
domestic market. Cooperation between the 
relevant breweries can then serve as an 
instrument for sharing markets, resulting in 
the reinforcement of an existing dominant 
position - in this case in Belgium - to the 
detriment of other, mostly small, breweries 
and independent beer suppliers. 
During the course of the proceedings, the 
two companies amended their agreement to 
bring it into line with the competition rules. 
In essence, Carlsberg agreed to set up a new 
joint venture with a Belgian beer wholesaler, 
which will distribute its products in compe-
tition with Interbrew, which retains a non-
exclusive licence. By its action, the Com-
mission ensured that Belgian beer consu-
mers would be able to choose between sup-
pliers of luxury beers, and that competition 
for the sale of such products would be 
active, resulting in lower prices. 
13 14 
Approval decisions 
Where companies collaborate in an area in 
which they have previously competed inde-
pendently with one another, they obviously 
restrict competition between them. None the 
less, the Commission is aware that, particu-
larly in globalizing markets, such collabora-
tion may be vital to enable firms to exploit 
the economies of scale necessary to com-
pete. By collaborating, they may be able to 
improve the efficiency of their research and 
development (R&D) efforts, or reduce pro-
duction or distribution costs, thus increasing 
their competitiveness. As a consequence of 
these considerations, the Commission gener-
ally takes a positive approach to research 
and development or joint production agree-
ments between companies, providing, of 
course, that they do not lead to the elimina-
tion of effective competition in the Commu-
nity, one of the preconditions for the grant-
ing of an exemption from Article 85(1). 
Decisions adopted in 1994 by the Com-
mission reflect this approach. They also 
illustrate the attitude that has been taken by 
the Commission in many further cases of 
less legal, economic or political importance, 
which were settled by comfort letter and are 
not covered in this survey. 
Strategic alliances 
In markets such as telecommunications, 
which is globalizing rapidly due to technical 
progress and liberalization, companies may 
choose to collaborate on a wide range of 
matters, usually accompanied by the acqui-
sition of shares by one or both of the compa-
nies in their partners. Such operations pose 
particular difficulties for the competition 
authorities - the nature of the future range of 
collaboration is sometimes imprecise, and 
yet the quasi-structural nature of the opera-
tion requires an analysis based not only on 
the effects of the specific collaboration iden-
tified at the time the operation is notified, 
but also the likely long-term structural 
effects of the deal. Nevertheless, in globaliz-
ing markets, the Commission does, in princi-
ple, view such agreements positively. This 
approach can be seen in both the BT/MCI 
and Olivetti/Digital cases. 
BT/MCI 
British Telecommunications (United King-
dom) acquired a 20% share of MCI (United 
States), and the two companies agreed to set 
up a joint venture, named Concert, which 
will provide enhanced and value-added glo-
bal telecommunications services to multina-
tional or large regional companies. The two 
companies contributed most of their existing 
activities in this field to the joint venture. 
Although the Commission found that the 
operation resulted in a restriction of compe-
tition - BT and MCI were at least potential 
competitors not only in the overall market 
for telecommunications, but also in the spe-
cific market segment targeted by Concert -
it concluded that an exemption could be 
granted, as the benefits resulting from the 
operation would outweigh these negative 
effects. 
In particular, it was considered that Concert 
will develop a set of new advanced global 
services more quickly than either BT or MCI 
would be capable of providing alone. By 
creating Concert, each parent will also sub-
stantially reduce the costs and risks inherent-
ly associated with the offering of such ser-
vices on the scale and with the particular 
features required by international compa-
nies. However, the exemption was only 
granted once assurances were received that, 
despite the appointment of BT as exclusive 
distributor in the European Economic Area 
(EEA), any customer in this area can obtain 
Concert's services through MCI instead of 
BT, and also once the parties amended a pro-
vision intended to dissuade MCI from enter-
ing some sectors of the telecommunications 
market in the EEA. ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
Olivetti/Digital 
These two computer companies agreed that 
Digital would provide Olivetti with its Alpha 
AXP technology (which is used in comput-
ers to increase processing speed), and in 
return Olivetti would use only Digital's 
licensed technology in certain products, and, 
furthermore, would purchase certain AXP 
components from Digital. Digital agreed to 
continue purchasing Intel-based PCs from 
Olivetti for its European sales operations. 
Although the agreement was originally 
accompanied by the acquisition by Digital of 
8% of Olivetti's share capital, these shares 
were subsequently sold. 
The Commission exempted the operation, as 
it concluded that its restrictive effects were 
outweighed by benefits resulting from the 
increased dissemination of Digital's 
advanced Alpha AXP technology, which will 
promote technical progress, and because 
there are several competing technologies 
available on the market. 
R&D and production joint ventures 
Fujitsu/AMD 
Fujitsu (Japan) and Advanced Micro De-
vices (AMD - US) set up a joint 
venture, Fujitsu AMD, which will manufac-
ture advanced microchips for use in the next 
generation of high-tech products. The mar-
ket for such products is very dynamic. In 
particular, the segment for flash memories 
(one of the microchips which will be pro-
duced by the joint venture) is forecast to 
increase tenfold between 1992 and 1996. 
This is expected to lead to lower prices and 
the more widespread use of these high-tech 
products. The Commission concluded that 
the establishment of the joint venture falls 
within the scope of Article 85(1) because it 
restricts competition between the parties, 
who are competitors in this field. A territori-
al restriction included in the Technology 
Cross-licence Agreement reserving, for five 
years, to Fujitsu, the right to sell actively in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, and to 
AMD to sell actively in the rest of the EEA, 
was also found to fall under Article 85(1). 
However, the Commission considered that 
an individual exemption could be granted 
because the restrictive effects were out-
weighed by the resultant benefits. In partic-
ular, it concluded that the dissemination of a 
new generation of semiconductors would 
lead to technical and economic progress by 
making possible the production of increas-
ingly smaller, faster, and more reliable elec-
tronic products ranging from computers to 
portable telephones. 
International Private Satellite Partners 
Nine companies, which are mostly active in 
the telecommunications equipment or aero-
space sectors, set up a joint venture to pro-
vide international telecommunications ser-
vices via satellite to companies in Europe 
and the United States. The joint venture will 
own two satellites, the first of which was 
launched in November 1994. The Com-
mission granted negative clearance, because 
it concluded that the companies were not 
competitors of one another in this market -
none of them could have undertaken the pro-
ject on their own. Furthermore, it considered 
that the project would increase competition 
on the market for such services and for 
satellite transmission capacity: the joint 
venture will be a new competitor of the big 
strategic alliances being established and, 
moreover, will sell spare capacity on the 
satellite to third parties. 
Exxon/Shell 
The Commission granted an exemption to 
the agreements between these American and 
Anglo/Dutch companies establishing a pro-
duction joint venture which will produce lin-
ear polyethylene for its parents. Following 
action by the Commission, the companies 
modified their original agreements, increas-
ing the freedom of each party to supplement 
independently their original investment in  15 16 
the joint venture. The modified agreements 
also result in increased independence for the 
management of the joint venture and permits 
each party to use part of the capacity dedi-
cated to the other, in the event that the latter 
fails to take all its allotted share. These 
measures are intended to limit, as far as pos-
sible, the effects of the collaboration on the 
competitive relationship between the parties. 
The market in question was considered to 
have oligopolistic characteristics, and thus 
the compatibility of such a joint venture 
between two major competitors with the 
competition rules was far from evident. 
None the less, the operation was exempted 
for 10 years mainly because the restrictions 
resulting from the joint venture were the 
minimum possible to enable the project to 
succeed, and because, as the plant would use 
the latest production technology, the linear 
polyethylene would be produced very effi-
ciently, enabling the sale of this product at 
very competitive prices. 
Pasteur Mérieux/Merck 
In October, the Commission exempted a 
joint venture between Merck (United States) 
and Pasteur Mérieux Serums et Vaccins, a 
subsidiary of Rhône Poulenc (France). The 
joint venture will take over all the human 
vaccine activities of the two companies. A 
major objective of the joint venture is the 
creation and development of new multiva-
lent vaccines — the combination of several 
antigens in one vaccine. The joint venture 
will accelerate the availability of such multi-
valent vaccines as it will have a large portfo-
lio of monovalent vaccines for combination. 
This will lead to important public health 
benefits, in particular for paediatric vaccina-
tion. Children will benefit from the avail-
ability of a single 'cocktail' injection, for 
immunization against a whole range of dis-
eases including diphtheria, tetanus, pertus-
sis, polio, hepatitis Β and haemophilus 
influenza Β (one of the causes of meningi-
tis). The joint venture will also stimulate 
competition for more and better new mono-
valent vaccines and contribute to a net 
improvement in distribution of existing and 
future Merck-origin vaccines. 
In granting an exemption, the Commission 
also took account of the fact that, although 
the parties are both among the leading 
worldwide vaccine producers, Merck has an 
extremely limited European presence out-
side Germany, despite entering the European 
vaccine markets at the beginning of the 
1970s. Moreover, as the parties' European 
vaccine portfolios are to a large extent com-
plementary, there are only a few overlaps 
between the parties' vaccines on specific 
national vaccine markets. In order to limit 
further any anticompetitive effect of the 
agreement, the parties furthermore agreed to 
amend their agreement as originally notified 
in relation to the French measles/mumps/ 
rubella vaccine markets, the French, German 
and Scandinavian EFTA countries' mono-
valent Hib (haemophilus influenza B) mar-
kets and the cooperation agreements with 
Behringwerke AG, the German distributor 
of Merck's vaccines. The restrictions of 
competition accordingly became very 
limited. 
Philips/Osram 
The Commission exempted an agreement 
between Philips (Netherlands) and Osram, a 
subsidiary of Siemens (Germany), to com-
bine all their activities in the manufacture 
and sale of lead glass used for lamp manu-
facture. Osram's glassmaking facilities, 
based in Berlin, had reached the end of their 
economic life and were due to be closed. 
The joint venture would therefore be based 
in Philips' existing facilities in Lommel, 
Belgium, which would be extended. This 
would enable the joint project to benefit 
from important economies of scale. The out-
put from the joint venture would be supplied 
to the parent companies and to other lamp 
manufacturers. 
Although it was considered that the agree-
ment restricted competition and thus fell 
within Article 85(1), an individual exemp-ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
tion was granted in the light of the efficien-
cies resulting from the project, and the fact 
that several alternative sources of supply 
exist both within and outside the European 
Union. Another important element that led 
the Commission to grant an exemption in 
this case was the environmental benefits 
likely to result from the project. First, unlike 
the Berlin plant of Osram, Philips' Lommel 
factory is fitted with advanced equipment to 
reduce the emission problems inherent in the 
manufacture of lead glass. Second, one of 
the major tasks of the joint venture will be to 
develop lead-free products for use in lamps. 
Such progress would provide significant 
environmental benefits in terms of air pollu-
tion. 
Saint-Gobain/Asahi Glass 
In December, the Commission exempted a 
number of agreements concluded between 
Saint-Gobain Vitrage International (France) 
and Asahi Glass Company Ltd (Japan) relat-
ing to joint research and the development of 
bi-layer products intended mainly for the 
manufacture of glass for motor vehicles. 
Essentially, the agreement sets up a joint 
venture between Saint-Gobain and Asahi 
Glass which will pool their know-how and 
research capacities in these new technolo-
gies. 
The Commission was particularly aware of 
the benefits in terms of safety which consu-
mers would derive from technical coopera-
tion between a Community firm and a Japa-
nese firm that already has advanced know-
how in this field. Motor vehicle windshields 
using this technology are made by laminat-
ing mineral glass with polyurethane film, the 
combination of which allows better mechan-
ical energy absorption. These products are 
supposed to provide better protection for 
vehicle occupants, greater resistance to 
impact and a reduced risk of injuries in the 
event of collision. The parties have reached 
a comparable level of knowledge, and in the 
field of bi-layer technology this knowledge 
is largely complementary. Exemption was 
granted after the parties had amended their 
agreement in such a way that the period cov-
ered will expire at the end of a five-year term 
starting on the date on which commercial 
production begins in the Community, and at 
any rate by the year 2005. 
Transport cases 
In 1994, the Commission adopted four 
exemption decisions relating to international 
rail transport. All four cases concerned the 
joint marketing of new international ser-
vices, and three of these concerned services 
between the United Kingdom and continen-
tal Europe resulting from the opening of the 
Channel Tunnel. All these cases involved 
agreements between companies which are 
the owners of the railway infrastructure in 
their respective countries or which are the 
only suppliers of rail traction services. These 
companies, therefore, own essential facil-
ities, access to which is indispensable to the 
provision of international transport services. 
It is important that the Commission exam-
ines such agreements carefully, as coopera-
tion between these companies, which has the 
aim of enabling them to enter jointly newly 
emerging international transport markets, 
could further reinforce their already domi-
nant position on their respective national 
markets and make access by competing 
transport providers either impossible or 
extremely difficult. On the other hand, entry 
into these new markets, many of which are 
central to the creation of effective trans-
European networks, requires considerable 
investment in transport equipment and fixed 
installations and the economic viability of 
such new activities is uncertain. Therefore, 
the rapid promotion of these new services 
for the benefit of European industry and 
consumers can, in certain cases, only occur 
as a result of cooperation between the 
national rail companies. The decisions 
adopted by the Commission in 1994 in this 
area demonstrate its approach in balancing 
these important considerations. Further-
more, when analysing such cases, the Com-
mission has to take into account that Coun- 17 cil Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991, 
which liberalizes international rail transport 
services, provides, under certain conditions, 
access by any EU rail company to the rail-
way infrastructure in all Member States. The 
Directive is also applicable to the railway 
infrastructure of the Channel Tunnel which 
is owned by Eurotunnel. The Commission 
has to ensure that collaborative agreements, 
particularly those that provide for the reser-
vation of a certain proportion of available 
infrastructure to any given company or 
grouping of companies, are not contrary to 
competition law and do not frustrate the 
aims of this Directive. 
vices by train between the United Kingdom 
and continental Europe via the Channel Tun-
nel through a newly created joint venture 
(ACI). Combined transport services involve 
journeys made up of two different transport 
modes: in this case, train and road transport. 
The Commission considered that British 
Rail, SNCF and Intercontainer were poten-
tial competitors on this market and, there-
fore, the joint service eliminated competi-
tion between them. Furthermore, it conclud-
ed that the joint venture may impede access 
to the market by competing transport opera-
tors. 
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Eurotunnel 
The Eurotunnel decision concerned an 
agreement concluded between Eurotunnel, 
British Rail and SNCF. The agreement 
reserves part of the Tunnel's infrastructure 
capacity (the 'slots' when trains can use the 
Tunnel) to British Rail and SNCF, to the 
exclusion of Eurotunnel itself and all other 
rail transport companies. This severely lim-
its competition between the parties and has a 
significant foreclosure effect towards third 
parties. However, taking into account the 
special nature of the Channel Tunnel project, 
the construction and operation of which 
involves an exceptionally high investment 
and risk, the Commission granted an exemp-
tion for 30 years, subject to certain condi-
tions designed to minimize the negative 
effects on competition. These conditions 
limit the amount of the available capacity in 
the Tunnel that is reserved to British 
Rail/SNCF, and ensure that other competing 
railway undertakings will be able to obtain 
access to the Tunnel infrastructure to operate 
competing international transport services. 
Allied Continental Intermodal Services 
(ACI) 
British Rail, SNCF and Intercontainer (a 
combined transport operator owned by 24 
railway undertakings) agreed to market 
jointly international combined transport ser-
As the two railway undertakings now have 
an interest in one specific company offering 
combined transport services, the risk exists 
that they would be less willing to provide 
access to their networks or rail services to 
companies offering competing services. 
None the less, the Commission exempted 
the ACI joint venture for a transitional peri-
od of five years given the specific features of 
the case: the service provided by ACI is 
completely new and involves considerable 
financial risks. The Commission imposed 
certain conditions to limit the restrictions 
and to guarantee market access for other 
combined transport operators. In particular, 
the Commission obliged British Rail and 
SNCF to supply to competing transport 
operators the same rail services as they 
supply to their joint venture, ACI, on a 
non-discriminatory basis. 
Night Services 
Four public railway undertakings (British 
Rail, SNCF, Deutsche Bundesbahn and 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen) agreed to set up a 
joint venture which will operate night pas-
senger trains on four routes between the 
United Kingdom and continental Europe via 
the Channel Tunnel. This case raised the 
same issues as the ACI case and was 
exempted by the Commission for a transi-
tional period of eight years under similar 
conditions as the ACI joint venture. ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
The ACI and Night Services decisions dem-
onstrate the importance the Commission 
attaches to the introduction of new high-
quality transport services by rail to accom-
pany the opening of the Channel Tunnel. 
These new transport services provide a sub-
stitute for traditional transport services by 
sea or air and, therefore, increase competi-
tion between modes of transport. 
Communautés d'intérêts automobiles 
(CIA) 
The Commission approved a framework 
Cooperation Agreement between 13 railway 
companies relating to the international car-
riage of new motor vehicles between assem-
bly plants and distribution centres. The aim 
of the cooperation is to increase the use of 
rail travel for such operations, an objective 
that is encouraged by the EU common trans-
port policy. The cooperation involved the 
adoption of a common marketing strategy 
and a common tariff structure, but the parties 
abandoned the fixing of common transport 
tariffs, at the Commission's insistence. The 
tariffs are fixed by the companies directly 
involved for each international route. Al-
though the Commission concluded that this 
cooperation restricted competition between 
the rail companies, including competition on 
prices, it exempted the cooperation because 
of its positive effects on quality of service 
and promotion of rail transport. 
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Legislative developments 
The objectives underlying the Commission's 
legislative initiatives with respect to Articles 
85 and 86 in 1994 were: 
(i) the continuation of a process that has 
now been active for a number of years -
the reduction of the costs of complying 
with the Community rules, and particu­
larly so for Community SMEs; 
(ii) ensuring not only that the rights of 
defence of companies are respected dur­
ing Community competition proceed­
ings, but also that this requirement is 
achieved in a manner that is simple and, 
above all, manifestly fair and objective; 
(iii) transparency - ensuring that the Com­
mission's approach is well known by EU 
industry; and 
(iv) ensuring that the Community's competi­
tion policy is always based on a sound 
economic analysis of the market in 
which the agreement or practice in ques­
tion operates. 
Although all these objectives can be seen in 
each of the legislative projects undertaken 
this year, the first (reduction of regulatory 
costs) and fourth (ensuring that decisions are 
based on a full assessment of the market) are 
particularly relevant to the revision of form 
A/B and the de minimis notice. 
Form A/B is the form that must be used for 
notifying agreements to the Commission 
when applying for exemption or negative 
clearance. The new version was adopted by 
the Commission at the end of 1994 follow­
ing detailed and widespread consultation, 
which led the Commission to make substan­
tial changes to its original proposal. The 
final version contains two separate sections, 
one shorter version for 'standard' notifica­
tions; the other, far more detailed, for coop­
erative joint ventures, which benefit from 
accelerated treatment by the Commission's 
departments. (In 1992, the Commission 
announced that it would endeavour, hence­
forth, to send either a comfort letter or a 
warning letter within two months from the 
receipt of a complete notification of a coop­
erative joint venture involving structural 
change.) It is hoped that the new form will 
reduce regulatory costs in two ways. 
(i) It should be simpler to complete than the 
previous version, as the instructions and 
questions are more straightforward. This 
should assist companies in limiting the 
need for external legal advice when sub­
mitting notifications. 
(ii) A provision has been introduced where­
by the Commission can 'waive' the obli­
gation to provide all the information 
requested by the form. The purpose of 
this is to allow companies to contact the 
Commission when they believe that 
some of the information requested in the 
form is not relevant or necessary in their 
particular case. If the Commission 
agrees, the notification will be consid­
ered complete notwithstanding the fail­
ure to provide all the details required by 
the fοιτη. 
In addition to this, it is expected that the 
revision will assist companies to make clear­
er, more targeted notifications, avoiding 
irrelevant and unnecessary information, 
while, on the other hand, ensuring that they 
provide all the information essential for the 
Commission to begin its investigations. This 
should help the Commission in its continu­
ing efforts to deal more quickly with all 
types of notifications, and reduce the num­
ber of occasions where it is obliged to 
request further information from the compa­
nies concerned once a notification has been 
received. 
The de minimis notice was also revised in 
1994. This notice was conceived in 1970 as 
a measure to benefit SMEs. Agreements 
between such companies rarely have eco­
nomic consequences which affect the Com­
munity as a whole, and, therefore it was 
thought appropriate to provide clear criteria ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
to enable SMEs to determine whether their 
agreements fall outside the scope of the 
Community's competition rules. This ratio-
nale still remains highly appropriate, and it 
was decided to increase the thresholds set 
out in the notice to take account of inflation 
and growth in gross domestic product 
(GDP). The new notice specifies that where 
companies sign agreements which restrict 
competition, but none the less the criteria set 
out in the notice are met, no notification is 
necessary, and the Commission will not 
challenge the agreement. Thus, an agree-
ment will be considered to be 'automat-
ically' de minimis if: 
(i) the combined global turnover of the 
groups to which the parties belong does 
not exceed ECU 300 million, and 
(ii) the combined market share of the groups 
to which the parties belong does not 
exceed 5% of the relevant market. 
The third major legislative project undertak-
en in this area by the Commission in 1994 
concerns the revision of the mandate of the 
Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer is a 
Commission official, but one who is admin-
istratively separate from the Directorate-
General for Competition. He or she is 
quasi-independent - the Hearing Officer can 
only be removed by a vote of the college of 
Commissioners. The function of the Hearing 
Officer is essentially to ensure that the rights 
of defence of companies involved in compe-
tition proceedings are respected, and, in par-
ticular, to 'ensure that the (oral) hearing is 
properly conducted and thus contribute to 
the objectivity of the hearing itself and of 
any decision taken subsequently. The Hear-
ing Officer shall seek to ensure in particular 
that in the preparation of draft Commission 
decisions in competition due account is 
taken of all the relevant facts, whether 
favourable or unfavourable to the parties 
concerned' (Article 2(1) of the Hearing Offi-
cer's mandate). Since the creation of this 
post in 1982, the role of the Hearing Officer 
has been universally applauded. The Com-
mission therefore decided to extend the role 
of the Hearing Officer to cover the following 
areas: 
Deadline for reply to the statement of objec-
tions: An undertaking may consider that the 
deadline imposed upon it for reply to the 
statement of objections is too short. In such 
a case, the Hearing Officer will decide 
whether or not an extension to this deadline 
should be granted. 
Access to relevant information: It is impor-
tant that undertakings should be confident 
that the Commission carries out its respon-
sibilities regarding access to files carefully, 
fairly and objectively, and, subject to the 
obligations imposed upon it regarding confi-
dentiality, discloses all documents that may 
be favourable to the undertakings concerned 
in preparing their defence. Thus, it was 
decided that if a company believed that the 
Commission has not provided it with all the 
documents necessary for its defence, the 
Hearing Officer should examine any such 
claim and decide on its merits. 
Hearings: Since the Hearing Officer is 
responsible for organizing hearings, the 
Commission decided that he or she should 
also have the task of deciding who is to be 
allowed to speak at these events. In particu-
lar, the Hearing Officer should also be given 
the right to decide whether third parties 
should be allowed to intervene. 
Business secrets and other confidential 
information: In performing the abovemen-
tioned tasks, the Hearing Officer should also 
be able to decide which items of information 
supplied by a firm and contained in the 
Commission's file can be communicated to 
other firms or published. 
In 1994, the Commission also continued its 
consultations regarding the review of its 
block exemption on intellectual property 
licensing. It published for consultation a 
draft Regulation that combines the two pre-
vious patent and know-how Regulations and 
also proposed the inclusion of market-share 
thresholds, effectively excluding from the  21 scope of the Regulation agreements between 
companies holding very significant market 
shares (over 40%), or holding significant 
market shares in oligopolistic markets. On 
the other hand, the draft Regulation pro-
posed a reduction in the list of 'blacklisted' 
clauses whose inclusion in an agreement 
would result in it being unable to benefit 
from the Regulation. 
This approach results from the concern of 
the Commission that the present block 
exemption Regulations treat a licensing 
agreement between companies holding a 
dominant position in the same manner as an 
agreement between small companies with 
minimal market shares. Clearly, the former 
is far more likely to result in important 
restrictions of competition than the latter. 
However, during the consultation process 
with industry and consumer groups, it 
became clear there was very general concern 
that the introduction of such thresholds 
would lead to increased regulatory costs and 
legal uncertainty. The balance of these two 
conflicting consequences in the Com-
mission's proposed approach is a difficult 
and important exercise. It was therefore 
decided to roll over the existing patent 
licensing Regulation (which expired in 
1994) to enable further consideration and 
consultation. 
Consultations were also begun regarding the 
renewal of the Commission's block exemp-
tion Regulation on selective distribution for 
automobiles. In the revised draft Regulation, 
which was published for comments, the 
Commission takes the view that car dealer-
ship arrangements, which are traditional in 
the Community, continue to merit exemp-
tion, but under strict conditions. Thus, while 
it is proposed that car manufacturers may 
grant dealers an exclusive territory and 
require all dealers to meet certain minimum 
quality standards, they may not, for exam-
ple, take measures preventing Community 
citizens from purchasing cars in the Member 
States where they are the cheapest. The new 
draft Regulation envisages a number of 
changes from the existing Regulation aimed 
at increasing the commercial freedom of 
dealers, thus ensuring that increased benefits 
resulting from the distribution system are 
passed to the consumer. It is expected that 
the Commission will adopt the final version 
of the Regulation in 1995 following wide-
spread consultations. 
Finally, the Commission adopted a draft 
notice on the application of the EU competi-
tion rules to cross-border credit transfers. 
The draft notice is part of a wider package of 
measures, including a proposal for a Direc-
tive, whose aim is to improve cross-border 
payments. The draft notice sets out the 
approach the Commission intends to take 
when assessing the compatibility of cross-
border credit transfer systems with the EU 
competition rules. Guidance is given as to 
non-price competition aspects (membership 
rules and operational rules) and price com-
petition aspects. An important part of the 
draft notice relates to a collectively agreed 
interbank fee. The Commission considers 
that where agreements on multilateral inter-
change fees are shown to be actually neces-
sary for the successful implementation of 
certain forms of cooperation, positive in 
themselves, between a number of banks, 
agreements on interchange fees may be eli-
gible for exemption under Article 85(3). 
Where banks introduce interchange-fee 
arrangements, the Commission will examine 
the economic benefit which these arrange-
ments seek to achieve and consider whether 
consumers will receive a fair share of the 
resulting benefit and whether the particular 
interchange-fee arrangements are actually 
necessary as a means to achieve that benefit. 
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Decentralization of the 
competition rules 
The Commission held discussions in 1994 
with the national cartel authorities on ways 
and means of increasing their involvement 
in the application of the Community compe-
tition rules, in the same way that the nation-
al courts have the power to apply the Com-
munity competition rules in cases appearing 
before them. The conclusions reached in 
such discussions will be set out in a commu-
nication which the Commission will draw up 
in collaboration with the national author-
ities. 
The objective in introducing some decentral-
ization in the application of the Community 
competition rules is to make the rules more 
effective at national level without increasing 
monitoring costs or diminishing the benefits 
to industry of the existence of uniform com-
petition rules within the common market. 
The decentralization aimed at must establish 
the right balance between the general trend 
towards subsidiarity, on the one hand, and 
the maintenance of a system of uniform pro-
tection of competition for all firms within 
the common market (level playing-field), on 
the other. The Commission believes that the 
application of the same rules of substance by 
15 national authorities and itself will be a 
major factor in the integration of the com-
mon market which can increase the level of 
competition, and will thereby enhance the 
competitiveness of European industry. 
In order to achieve this objective, it is pro-
posed that the application of the Community 
competition rules be decentralized where 
three conditions are met: 
(i) the case essentially involves a single 
Member State; 
(ii) there is a clear infringement of the Com-
munity rules; 
(iii)the infringement has no chance of being 
exempted by the Commission on 
grounds which are provided for in Com-
munity law and for whose implementa-
tion the Commission is solely respon-
sible. 
Such decentralization will ensure that cases 
are dealt with by a single cartel authority at 
the most appropriate level and is in line with 
the spirit behind the provisions in the Mer-
ger Regulation allowing merger cases to be 
referred to a Member State. 
23 Statistical overview 
In almost all respects, 1994 was an excellent 
year for the Commission with regard to the 
number and efficiency with which cases 
were handled. First, it should be noted that a 
greater number of formal decisions were 
adopted than ever before. 
This is very encouraging and represents the 
fruits of continuing efforts to rationalize and 
streamline internal procedures; when the 
importance and complexity of the cases 
adopted is taken into account, this figure is 
particularly satisfying. Second, the stock of 
cases remaining open at the end of the year 
has again been reduced and is now 1 058. 
This compares with over 3 000 cases that 
remained open at the end of the 1980s, and a 
reduction of 168 compared with the end of 
1993. As a result of the intensive efforts to 
reduce the backlog over the previous years, 
almost all the 'simple' cases (presenting lit-
tle or no substantive problems) have now 
been closed, and the number of cases 
remaining open is now approaching that 
which represents the cases being actively 
treated. For this reason, the net reduction in 
the stock of cases achieved in 1994 was less 
than in previous years. In the future, further 
significant reductions will be progressively 
more difficult to achieve. None the less, the 
Commission remains committed to its 
attempts to reduce continually the number of 
cases remaining open. 
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25 MONOPOLY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY: ARTICLE 90 
Introduction 
Article 90 is based on the underlying princi-
ple that an undertaking that has been granted 
monopoly rights by a Member State, wheth-
er it be State-owned or in private hands, is 
subject to the competition rules in the same 
way as any other company. Thus, as monop-
oly companies by definition hold a dominant 
position, they must pay particular attention 
not to engage in abusive activities. They 
may not, for example, engage in 'tying': 
refusing to provide the monopoly service 
unless customers also purchase other goods 
or services which are open to free competi-
tion. Equally, they must be careful not to use 
revenue from their monopoly activities to 
subsidize sales in other markets, thereby 
artificially disadvantaging their competitors. 
This flows from Articles 85 and 86, which 
apply to undertakings irrespective of their 
statute. 
Article 90 of the Treaty complements this 
basic rule, providing specific provisions 
concerning State measures taken with 
respect to companies that have been granted 
State monopoly rights. It recognizes not 
only the particular competition problems 
that may be created by such measures, but 
also the need to take account of the specific 
tasks and objectives that such companies are 
often entrusted with. Article 90 contains a 
basic principle, and an exception. Its basic 
principle is that Member States must respect 
the underlying rule that companies granted 
monopoly rights must, in principle, comply 
with the Treaty's rules, and must not, there-
fore, act to undermine this. 
This means not only that they may not take 
measures that will lead companies granted 
monopoly rights to infringe the competition 
rules by, for example, tying, but, further-
more, it means that in certain circumstances 
the grant or maintenance of a monopoly 
right can in itself infringe the Treaty provi-
sions on competition and free movement and 
therefore be illegal. 
It is logical that the competition rules should 
require the careful examination of monop-
oly rights. The effect of such measures is to 
frustrate all the most basic aims of the single 
market process, such as the free movement 
of goods and services. Member States may 
be tempted to grant domestic companies 
limited or even complete monopoly powers 
in order to protect them from the intensify-
ing competition from firms based in other 
Member States. The Commission's powers 
in this area are therefore parallel to and com-
plement those which enable it to act against 
other trade barriers imposed by Member 
States, such as hidden quotas and excise 
duties. 
The exception contained in Article 90 results 
from the fact that State monopolies are usu-
ally entrusted with some public service func-
tion. They are normally required to perform 
a specific (and sometimes unprofitable) ser-
vice in the public interest. Actions taken to 
meet these public service obligations can be 
immune from the competition and other 
Treaty rules, providing that they are truly 
indispensable to meet such legitimate aims. 
This exemption from the Treaty rules is, 
however, strictly applied: there must be no 
other reasonable and less-restrictive manner 
of meeting the objectives in question. For 
example, the national postal services are 
entrusted with the public service function of 
providing a basic collection and delivery 
service to all citizens at a uniform price. 
Using revenue generated from profitable 
local deliveries to finance more remote, 
loss-making, deliveries could be immune 
from the competition rules as a result of the 
Article 90 exception. Using revenue gener-
ated by monopoly activities to undercut 
competitors in other markets - such as bank-
ing - would not, however, be immune. The 
former action is necessary to achieve the 
public service objectives, the latter is not. 
Although the exception applies to specific 
actions of State-granted monopolies which 
would in normal circumstances infringe the 
competition rules as well as the question of 
the legality of the grant or maintenance of  27 28 
monopoly rights as such, it is, in fact, more 
important with respect to the latter than the 
former. In the past, the Commission has 
dealt with a number of cases where a State 
monopoly was engaging in an activity that 
normally constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
position - tying, discriminating, or refusing 
to supply, for example. The companies in 
question argued that the conduct was justi-
fied by the existence of public service obli-
gations. In every case this argument was 
rejected, because it was possible to demon-
strate that either there was no direct link 
between the abuse and the achievement of 
the public service objective, or that an alter-
native and less-restrictive manner of achiev-
ing the objective could reasonably have been 
chosen. On the other hand, the Commission 
has accepted that in some circumstances the 
grant or maintenance of monopoly rights 
may be the only reasonable manner to 
achieve public service objectives. 
In order to enforce Article 90, the Com-
mission may adopt decisions or directives 
addressed to Member States stating that a 
given measure infringes the Treaty and must 
be terminated. To companies, it addresses 
decisions under Articles 85(1) and 86 stating 
that their actions infringe the competition 
mies and cannot be defended by recourse to 
the Article 90 exception by virtue of their 
public service obligations. 
Although at first sight such directives 
addressed to Member States may appear leg-
islative in nature, and it may therefore be 
surprising that the Commission has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to adopt them, in fact 
Article 90 directives are not legislative; they 
are simply the clarification, or explicit state-
ment and enforcement, of existing legal 
rules set out in the Treaty. However, the 
Commission is well aware of the importance 
and impact of such directives, not only in 
legal and economic terms, but also political-
ly and socially. It is therefore committed to 
exercising its authority to adopt decisions or 
directives liberalizing previously monopo-
lized sectors only following wide-ranging 
discussion and debate with industry, consu-
mer groups, the Member States and Parlia-
ment. 
Telecommunications 
An essential precondition to liberalization is 
that the opening-up of the market in question 
to competition will not make it impossible 
for legitimate public service objectives to 
continue to be met. Partly as a consequence 
of this concern, liberalization of the tele-
communications sector in other parts of the 
world, notably the United States, has been 
achieved well in advance of Europe. How-
ever, over the past seven years, the Com-
munity has carried out a step-by-step pro-
gramme of liberalization that will lead to the 
full opening of the telecommunications ser-
vices markets to competition by 1998. 
The first step was taken in 1988 with the 
telecommunications terminal equipment 
Directive. This required the Member States 
to terminate monopolies granted to their 
national telecommunications operators for 
the sale of equipment such as telephones, 
modems and fax machines. The second and 
most important step was in 1990, when the 
Commission adopted a Directive requiring 
the abolition of monopoly rights for the pro-
vision of all telecommunications services, 
subject to four significant exceptions: 
(i) voice telephone services to the general 
public, 
(ii) satellite services, 
(iii) mobile telephone and paging services, 
and 
(iv) radio and television broadcasting ser-
vices to the public. 
The 1990 Directive, however, required the 
Commission to draw up a review paper in 
1992, to determine to what extent technolog-
ical and economic developments meant that 
some or all of these services could and 
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the universal service obligation. It was 
already clear at that stage that the telecom-
munications sector had been developing 
very quickly and, partly as a result of this 
and partly due to the favourable results of 
the existing liberalization measures, one of 
the options put forward in the review was 
that previously 'reserved' areas could be 
progressively liberalized. The review was 
the subject of wide consultation and discus-
sion with industry, consumer groups, Parlia-
ment and the Council and led to a large 
degree of consensus on this option. This 
resulted in the Council calling on the Com-
mission to take the steps necessary to pro-
vide for the full liberalization of the voice 
telephony service in the European Union by 
1 January 1998, subject to transitional 
arrangements for certain Member States. In 
1994, therefore, the Commission was pre-
paring the groundwork for this programme 
of liberalization. 
First, it adopted a Directive regarding satel-
lite communications. This opens up the sale 
of satellite equipment (satellites and ground 
stations) and the provision of satellite ser-
vices to free competition. The Directive will 
stimulate greater and more efficient use of 
business satellite communications, bridging 
the widening gap between the price and 
quality of services available in the Union 
and those which are enjoyed by US-based 
companies. 
Second, the Commission also issued a draft 
Directive for public consultation which, if 
finally adopted, will lift restrictions on the 
use of cable-television networks for the car-
riage of all liberalized telecommunications 
services. In the future, EU citizens should 
be able to receive such services from a wide 
range of different competing suppliers. The 
main aim of this draft Directive is to foster 
initiatives in the area of multimedia through-
out the European Union from 1 January 
1996. Most of these involve the transmission 
of moving pictures which the traditional 
telecommunications networks are not 
designed to - and in many cases cannot -
carry. 
Third, the Commission proposed, following 
consultation on its Green Paper on mobile 
and personal communications, the lifting of 
all special and exclusive rights with regard 
to mobile services and the underlying infra-
structure by 1 January 1996. This should 
transform the mobile telephone sector by the 
end of the decade from the premium/busi-
ness service which exists today to a service 
that will be affordable to all existing tele-
phone users. The Commission will only 
adopt a final Directive after careful consid-
eration of the comments received during the 
consultation process. 
Finally, work has started on the drafting of a 
Directive that will provide for the full liber-
alization of telecommunications services by 
1998. 
Energy 
Electricity in Europe remains considerably 
more expensive than, for example, in the 
United States. The competitive handicap that 
this places on our industry is evident. The 
Commission has submitted proposals to the 
Council and Parliament, pursuant to Article 
100a of the Treaty, to establish common 
rules for the electricity and gas industries. 
These proposals are designed to open up 
national monopolies so that the internal mar-
ket may function in the energy sector, while 
enabling public service obligations to be 
met. These aims are to be achieved, in par-
ticular, through third-party access to 
electricity and gas networks and the separa-
tion of accounts for production, transport 
and distribution functions. The proposals 
were amended following the European Par-
liament's opinion. In November 1994, the 
Council unanimously adopted conclusions 
highlighting political agreement on a num-
ber of key points, including the necessity to 
liberalize beyond the level of production; 
this latter issue has become the subject of 
detailed analysis and addresses the question 
of the modalities to be met to introduce in 
parallel different approaches of liberaliz-
ation (negotiated third-party access and 
single-buyer systems).  29 Postal services 
In 1994, the Commission continued to pre-
pare the further measures requested by the 
Council subsequent to the postal Green 
Paper. In this framework, studies were com-
missioned, in particular in the area of cross-
border mail. 
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Concept of State aid falling 
within the scope of Article 92(1) 
of the EC Treaty 
The first and frequently the most complex 
step in the Commission's examination is to 
check whether the aid in question meets the 
criteria set out in Article 92(1). Application 
of the market-investor principle to financial 
transactions by the Spanish State with the 
firm Inespal, and the bank Banesto, and by 
the German State with respect to Klöckner 
Stahl GmbH, prompted the Commission to 
conclude that no aid was involved for these 
undertakings. However, the opposite conclu-
sion was drawn in the case of transactions 
involving the French undertakings Bull and 
Air France, and the Commission expressed 
serious doubts when it initiated proceedings 
with respect to German measures in support 
of Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH. The 
sale of land by the city of Mainz at a price 
which was apparently below the market 
price was deemed possibly to be aid for the 
German firm Grundstücksverwaltungsge-
sellschaft Fort Malakoff Mainz mbH & Co. 
KG. The public guarantee for Altiforni e 
Ferriere di Servóla was considered to consti-
tute an advantage for the firm resulting in a 
distortion of competition, even if the firm's 
situation has not yet led it to make use of it. 
The Commission began work on drawing up 
a notice on this very frequent type of aid, 
which can have very substantial harmful 
effects on competition, particularly where 
the recipients are firms in difficulty, as is the 
case with firms receiving assistance under 
the Prodi Law in Italy and a number of 
schemes in the German Länder. 
A number of Commission decisions in 1994 
illustrated the distinction between general 
measures, which apply automatically to the 
whole of the economy and on which the 
State does not have any discretionary scope 
for action, and State aid which favours 'cer-
tain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods'. The application of the general 
German legislative provisions on bankrupt-
cy to the firm Saarstahl AG i.K without any 
intervention by the State fell within the first 
category, whereas the amendment of the 
Danish Electricity Act, which benefits only 
the firm SEAS, fell within the second. Simi-
larly, assistance provided by the Fonds 
national de l'emploi (National Employment 
Fund) to the firm Kimberly Clark at Sotte-
ville-les-Rouen was deemed by the Com-
mission to be aid since the French State 
could have exercised discretionary power as 
to the amount of its contribution to the firm's 
social plan. 
The Commission's monitoring of State aid 
does not apply only to aid that has an appre-
ciable impact on trade and competition 
between Member States, a condition which 
the Commission does not consider to be met 
if the aid satisfies the criteria set out in the 
de minimis rule adopted in 1992. However, 
the condition that trade must be affected 
may be met even where the whole of pro-
duction is exported outside the Community, 
as in the case of United Kingdom aid for 
tin mining in Cornwall. 
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The compatibility of aid with the 
common market under the 
derogations provided for in 
Article 92(2) and (3) 
A number of aid measures were deemed 
compatible under Article 92(2), for example, 
Dutch aid to assist flood victims and Ger-
man aid to restore a rail link in Bavaria that 
had been severed by the division of Ger-
many. The bulk of the aid which the Com-
mission deemed compatible with the com-
mon market was cleared on the basis of the 
derogations provided for in Article 92(3), 
particularly the regional derogation provided 
for in point (a) and the derogation provided 
for in point (c) for 'aid to facilitate the devel-
opment of certain economic activities or of 
certain economic areas, where such aid does 
not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest'. 
Rescue and restructuring aid for 
firms in difficulty 
The large number of strict conditions which 
the Commission attached to its approval of 
injections of capital by the French State into 
the firm Bull illustrates the very strict 
approach which the Commission codified in 
July when it adopted the Community guide-
lines on State aid for rescuing and restructur-
ing firms in difficulty. The aid is limited to the 
strict minimum necessary and is conditional 
upon the implementation of a realistic and 
precise restructuring plan that will ensure the 
long-term viability of the firm: in particular. 
Bull is to reduce its production capacity. 
The approval of the aid for the social plan 
of Kimberly Clark, Sotteville-les-Rouen 
(France), illustrates the favourable approach 
set out in the guidelines with regard to aid 
intended to finance social support schemes 
for workers made redundant by restructur-
ing. However, the Commission initiated 
detailed investigation proceedings into a 
number of aid measures that did not seem to 
fulfil the conditions set out in the guidelines. 
These included Italian aid for Iritecna SpA, 
Enichem SpA, and Enichem Agricoltura 
SpA, where proceedings were initiated with 
a view to examining the viability of the 
restructuring plan and assessing the effect 
of the aid on competition. It also included 
Spanish aid for Guascor, whose restructur-
ing plan provides for an increase in produc-
tion capacity, and German aid for 
Müller/Loesch, FAG Kugelfischer AG, INA 
Werk Schaeffler KG, Steinbock Boss GmbH 
Fördertechnik and Jungheinrich AG. In this 
last case, although the firms operate on mar-
kets with overcapacity, the aid does not seem 
to be linked to any reduction in capacity. 
Privatization aid 
The Commission extended the proceedings 
initiated with respect to the aid associated 
with the liquidation of the Italian public sec-
tor group EFIM to include the aid granted 
prior to the liquidation of its subsidiary 
Alumix. By contrast, as regards the restruc-
turing and privatization of TeleDanemark 
A/S, it considered that the Danish State was 
acting in the same way as a private investor 
operating in a market economy and that, 
consequently, the operation did not involve 
any aid within the meaning of Article 92(1). 
The monitoring of privatization operations 
carried out by the Treuhandanstalt (THA) in 
Germany continued. A number of important 
decisions were taken, including decisions to 
approve the aid for Lausitzer Teppichfaser 
AG and additional aid provided by Saxony-
Anhalt for Mitteldeutsche Erdöl-Raffinerie 
GmbH. Decisions were also taken to initiate 
proceedings with respect to aid made avail-
able by the THA for the petrochemical firms 
LEUNA-Werke AG, Buna GmbH and Säch-
sische Olefinwerke GmbH, and to terminate 
the proceedings initiated against a presumed 
abuse of previous aid for LEUNA-Werke 
AG. Lastly, in anticipation of the winding-
up of the THA by the end of 1994, negotia-
tions took place on the procedures and cri-
teria that will have to apply in 1995 to the 
THA's remaining firms. STATE AID 
Regional aid 
The Commission continued the work begun 
in 1993 on reviewing the maps of regions 
eligible for national aid, its aim being to 
reduce the eligible areas in percentage terms 
of the population and improve consistency 
with the areas eligible under the regional 
objectives of the Structural Funds. New 
maps were adopted for Germany, France 
(regional planning grant (PAT) scheme) and 
the part of Belgium eligible under Objec-
tive 1 (Hainaut); work is still in progress 
with respect to Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and the rest of Belgium. 
Examination under the State aid rules of the 
national measures part-financed by the 
Structural Funds also accounted for a sub-
stantial amount of time and resources. 
The Commission approved German regional 
schemes involving aid for restructuring 
firms in difficulty and employment aid. A 
positive final decision was taken on subsi-
dized loans for Sicilian firms involved in 
building and construction and public works, 
but Sicilian aid to cover the losses of a num-
ber of firms operating in the chemicals, 
cement and engineering industries, granted 
illegally and deemed incompatible with the 
common market, will have to be paid back. 
However, the Commission approved aid in 
Sicily for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), and concluded that aid in Sicily for 
the public enterprise Resais and aid to finance 
infrastructure projects did not fall within the 
scope of Article 92(1) of the Treaty. 
Lastly, the Commission approved changes to 
the Greek regional aid scheme and to the 
Portuguese PEDIP programme (strategic 
programme for dynamizing and modernizing 
Portuguese industry), which runs until 1999. 
Sectoral aid 
Having received the unanimous assent of the 
Council in December 1993, the Commission 
adopted in April, pursuant to Article 95 of 
the ECSC Treaty, decisions authorizing aid 
for the restructuring and privatization of 
steel companies in Germany (EKO Stahl 
GmbH and Sächsische Edelstahlwerke Freit-
al), Italy (Ilva), Spain (CSI and Sidenor) and 
Portugal (Siderurgia Nacional). 
The withdrawal of the Italian private sector 
group Riva in May 1994 led to the restruc-
turing plan for EKO Stahl being abandoned. 
In December, having received the Council's 
assent, the Commission approved aid of 
almost DM 900.62 million for EKO Stahl 
GmbH for a new restructuring plan involv-
ing the Belgian steel company Cockerill 
Sambre SA. It also approved aid of 
DM 385 million for the company by way of 
regional aid. 
On 19 December, the Council adopted Direc-
tive 94/7 3/EC amending the seventh Direc-
tive on aid to shipbuilding, and the Commis-
sion set the 1995 aid ceiling at 9%. In July, 
negotiations within the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) resulted in an agreement designed 
to ensure normal conditions of competition 
in commercial shipbuilding as from 
1 January 1996. The agreement was signed 
by all the parties on 21 December 1994. 
A number of aid cases were examined in the 
light of the 1989 Community guidelines on 
State aid to the motor vehicle industry. The 
Commission took the view that aid for 
investment carried out by FASA-Renault at 
Valladolid (Castile-Leon, Spain) and by 
Jaguar at Birmingham, Coventry and Liver-
pool (United Kingdom) was not dispropor-
tionate in view of the structural handicaps of 
the relevant regions. Since the investment 
did not result in any increases in capacity at 
group level, even aid that was slightly in 
excess of the amount needed to offset struc-
tural handicaps was acceptable. However, in 
a case involving restructuring aid for Volks-
wagen Sachsen (Germany), the Commission 
prohibited part of the aid which it deemed 
excessive in the light of restructuring costs 
and the reduction in capacity carried out, and 
it requested repayment of part of the incom-
patible aid that had been granted unlawfully.  33 34 
The Commission once again extended the 
rules on aid for the synthetic fibres industry 
until 30 June 1995. Pursuant to such rules, 
proceedings were initiated against aid for 
BVBA DS Profil (Belgium) and La Seda de 
Barcelona SA (Spain), and aid involving 
new production capacity for Carpets Interna-
tional pic (United Kingdom) was prohibited. 
Lastly, the Commission concluded that the 
foreseeable development of the textile mar-
ket and the importance of the regional impact 
of investment carried out by Hualon Corpo-
ration in Northern Ireland were sufficient to 
warrant the aid being deemed compatible. 
Horizontal aid 
The Commission approved a number of 
schemes under the Community guidelines 
on aid for small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs), with most of the cases being 
dealt with under the accelerated procedure 
provided for in the guidelines. The main 
decisions approving consultancy aid related 
to Germany and France. Proposed aid for 
technology parks and for risk capital for 
innovatory SMEs was approved for Den-
mark. The Commission also cleared aid for 
the establishment of an aid fund for SMEs in 
difficulty in Thuringia (Germany). 
The Community guidelines on State aid for 
research and development have been in force 
for eight years. The Commission decided to 
review the guidelines in the light of practical 
experience, the GATT agreement on subsidies 
and the objectives of the White Paper on 
growth, competitiveness, and employment. 
An initial exchange of views took place with 
national experts in December. Most of the aid 
measures examined by the Commission under 
the existing guidelines were approved, includ-
ing substantial aid for Glaxo (United King-
dom) in connection with the setting-up of a 
vaccine research institute and aid for SGS 
Thompson Microelectronics (France) in the 
semiconductor field. However, the Commissi-
on initiated proceedings in respect of that part 
of a repayable advance by the Spanish State to 
CASA (regarding a project relating to the 
CASA 3000 aircraft) that exceeded the thres-
holds normally allowed, and in respect of Ger-
man aid for Raiffeisen Hauptgenossenschaft 
Nord AG which, coupled with Community 
aid, amounted to 67% of the costs of a bio-
diesel production pilot plant. 
The year under review was the first year of 
application of the new Community guide-
lines on State aid for environmental protec-
tion, adopted in December 1993. The Com-
mission examined and approved a wide 
variety of measures submitted by Mem-
ber States, including aid measures in Ger-
many to assist energy conservation, 
waste management and the development of 
new technologies. It also approved projects 
in the Netherlands for the treatment of waste 
oils, ecotax legislation, the development and 
dissemination of technologies, noise control 
and the cleaning-up of polluted sites. 
Air transport 
Transport has traditionally been a sector sub-
ject to heavy regulation. Nevertheless, the 
liberalizing impulse launched within the 
framework of the internal market program-
me is starting to have wide-ranging effects. 
Thus, in aviation, three consecutive liberal-
ization packages have established the inter-
nal air transport market as of 1 January 
1993. In such a liberalized environment, the 
effective application of the competition rules 
becomes increasingly important. This inclu-
des both the combat against predatory prac-
tices by dominant carriers and the scrutiny 
of newly emerging alliances and mergers. 
At the same time, market liberalization 
requires a more stringent policy towards 
State aid granted to financially troubled air-
lines. The Commission responded to this 
requirement by adopting new guidelines for 
the application of the State aid rules in the 
aviation sector, and by making the approval 
of aid packages to such carriers as Aer Lin-
gus, Air France, TAP and Olympic Airways 
subject to a number of strict conditions. STATE AID 
Statistical overview 
During the year the Commission registered 
594 new cases, including 510 notifications 
of new aid or changes to existing aid meas-
ures, 68 cases of unnotified aid and 16 re-
examinations of existing aid. It took 527 
decisions in 1994. 
In 440 cases, it was decided not to raise any 
objections; in 40 cases it was decided to 
initiate proceedings under Article 93(2) of 
the EC Treaty or Article 6(4) of Decisi-
on 3855/91/ECSC. This led to the adoption 
of 15 positive final decisions, three negative 
final decisions and two conditional final 
decisions. The Commission decided to pro-
pose appropriate measures pursuant to 
Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty in respect of 
10 existing aid measures. 
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The high number of cases dealt with in the 
case of Germany (206) and, to a lesser 
extent, Spain (88) is due mainly to the 
decentralized administration of aid in those 
Member States (table 2). 
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Table 1 
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Table 2 
Decisions by Member States 
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37 MERGER REGULATION - 1994 
Overview 
Included in 1994 were the fifth anniversary 
of the adoption of the Merger Regulation 
and the completion of the fourth year of its 
operation. The Merger Regulation was 
adopted by the Council in 1989 with the 
objective of ensuring a single One-stop-
shop', and efficient control of important 
mergers, acquisitions, and certain joint ven-
tures that are likely to have effects in more 
than one Member State. The Regulation pro-
vides for two stages of investigation. A 
one-month initial investigation takes place 
to assess whether a notified operation raises 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with 
the common market. If it does not raise such 
doubts, it is cleared at the end of this initial 
period. If, on the other hand, serious doubts 
exist, an in-depth investigation takes place 
over a further maximum period of four 
months. Both stages are limited in time, with 
legal deadlines for the Commission's de-
cision. The Commission encourages notify-
ing parties to provide information ahead of 
notification so that it can, where possible, re-
duce the amount of information needed to be 
supplied. 
A large increase in the number of cases noti-
fied to the Commission under the Merger 
Regulation took place in 1994. Notifications 
rose from 58 in 1993 to 95 in 1994 - an 
increase of 64%. 
The year saw the completion of five in-depth 
investigations into operations that had raised 
serious doubts as to their compatibility with 
the common market. Of these five, one was 
prohibited - the MSG Media Service opera-
tion in the German pay-television market -
while two more were substantially modified 
before approval and the remaining two were 
approved. This was the largest number of 
decisions following a full five-month inves-
tigation since 1991. There were six decisions 
to start in-depth investigations in 1994 com-
pared with four in 1993. 
The proportion of cases which were cleared 
after one month remained broadly 
unchanged - 88% of cases compared with 
86% in 1993 - despite the considerable 
increase in cases. The number of decisions 
declaring the operation not to be subject to 
the Merger Regulation was less than in pre-
vious years at 5%. This was probably due to 
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the fact that after four years' operation of the 
Merger Regulation companies have a better 
knowledge of its jurisdictional rules and 
how the Commission applies them. 
The range of sectors covered by the deci-
sions was diverse and the Commission con-
sidered a number of both industrial and con-
sumer product markets during the year. Of MERGER REGULATION - 1994 
the decisions adopted after the initial one-
month period, 57% were in industrial sec-
tors, 18% in consumer goods and 25% in 
services. Heavy engineering and chemicals 
(including fibres) generated a significant 
number of cases, accounting for over a quar-
ter of the total. Banking and insurance was 
another active area. 
For the first time, the Commission declared 
two notifications incomplete until further 
information had been supplied by the notify-
ing parties. In three cases clearance deci-
sions were adopted without the need for an 
in-depth investigation only after the parties 
undertook to modify their operation to 
resolve competition problems identified by 
the Commission. In two of these cases (Uni-
lever/Ortiz Miko and Tractebel/Distrigaz) 
the parties abandoned the original operation 
and withdrew their notification. In both 
cases a restructured deal was notified and 
subsequently cleared by the Commission. 
Furthermore, in two cases {Unilever/Ortiz 
Miko and Elf Atochem/Riitgers), the Com-
mission accepted undertakings from the par-
ties in order to remove any competition 
problems. 
Operations notified under the Merger Regu-
lation are suspended for at least the first 
three weeks of the period following notifica-
tion and sometimes longer so that the Com-
mission does not have to order a divesture 
should an operation be prohibited. The num-
ber of cases where the suspension period 
was extended was much higher than in pre-
vious years, reflecting the fact that a number 
of difficult cases were treated where it was 
none the less possible to approve the opera-
tion during the first month. 
Interface with the Member States 
Under the Merger Regulation, a Member 
State may request the Commission to refer a 
notified case to the national competition 
authority in the State concerned where it is 
dealt with under the national merger control 
rules rather than the Merger Regulation. 
This is an exception to the 'one-stop-shop' 
principle under the Regulation but conforms 
with the principle of subsidiarity where a 
Member State can clearly show that a mer-
ger poses a threat to one or more markets 
within its territory. This situation arose in the 
Holdercini/Cedest case in 1994 where the 
Commission agreed to a request from the 
French authorities to refer part of the trans-
action which involved ready-mixed concrete 
and would result in large market shares in 
several local geographic markets all within 
France. By contrast, the Commission did not 
refer the MSG Media Service case to the 
German authorities, deciding instead to 
carry out an in-depth investigation of the 
case itself on the basis that the effects of this 
transaction would inevitably extend beyond 
Germany. 
In addition, while the Merger Regulation 
gives the Commission sole jurisdiction over 
mergers which fall under the Merger Regu-
lation, it allows Member States to act separ-
ately to protect other legitimate interests. 
These legitimate interests include freedom 
of the press. This provision was applied in 
the Newspaper publishing case where Itali-
an, Spanish and UK groups jointly bid to 
acquire control over the publishers of the 
Independent, a UK daily newspaper. The 
Commission assessed the competition 
aspects of the operation and approved it. The 
UK authorities also examined it under the 
terms of the national newspaper merger leg-
islation to protect the accurate presentation 
of news and the free expression of opinions. 
Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome permits 
Member States to take measures to protect 
their essential security interests. This provi-
sion had been invoked in the past in the con-
text of the Merger Regulation, and the Com-
mission has accepted on one occasion that 
an operation which concerned only military 
products need not be notified. This year saw 
the first operation where both military and 
civilian aspects of a concentration were 
assessed when the UK-based warship and 
submarine manufacturer VSEL was the sub-
ject of competing take-over bids by British  41 42 
Aerospace and GEC. VSEL's activities 
included a residual amount of manufacturing 
of oil and gas equipment by a subsidiary 
company. The acquisition of these activities 
was assessed by the Commission. The mili-
tary aspects of the bids were not notified 
under the Merger Regulation and were 
assessed by the United Kingdom authorities 
under the Fair Trading Act. The Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission subsequently car-
ried out an in-depth investigation into both 
bids. 
Decisions following in-depth 
investigations 
Privatization of AST: The sale of AST took 
place as part of the privatization of the Itali-
an State holding group Ilva. This privatiza-
tion had been the subject of a State aid deci-
sion which required the privatization to be 
completed by the end of 1994. The purchas-
er was a German/Italian consortium includ-
ing Krupp and Thyssen from Germany and 
Riva, Falck and Tadfin from Italy. The prod-
uct market was the production of stainless 
steel flat products and electric sheet and the 
geographic market was Western Europe. 
Krupp and Thyssen had already merged their 
stainless steel business and, following the 
acquisition of AST, the combined market 
share for stainless steel flat products was 
between 35 and 45%. The next largest com-
petitor, Ugine, had a market share between 
15 and 25% and there were five other com-
petitors with market shares between 5 and 
20%. As prices were declining and overca-
pacity existed in the market, it was not con-
sidered the operation would create a position 
of either single or oligopolistic dominance. 
The other markets concerned did not raise 
any competition concerns and the operation 
was approved. 
Dalmine/Mannesmann/Vallourec: This oper-
ation took place in the seamless stainless 
steel tubes sector and involved the formation 
of a joint venture containing the businesses 
in the above sector of Mannesmann, Ilva and 
Usinor. The joint venture (DMV) had a com-
bined market share of about 35% as did its 
principal competitor Sandvik. There were 
two other smaller competitors in the West 
European market. The Commission investi-
gated whether the operation would create a 
position of oligopolistic dominance either on 
its own or with Sandvik. Following the 
investigation, it was concluded that though 
these market shares could have led to a joint 
dominant position the presence of Japanese 
suppliers already in existence and the emer-
gence of East European producers who were 
developing the capability to supply products 
of comparable quality to compete with those 
in Western Europe would prevent this. Con-
sequently, the operation was authorized 
without conditions. 
Procter & Gamble (P&G)/VP Schickedanz 
(VPS): The proposed acquisition of the Ger-
man company VPS (which manufactured a 
range of paper products) by P&G required 
the Commission to carry out a detailed anal-
ysis of the feminine hygiene sector in the 
Community and to decide, in particular, that 
sanitary pads and tampons should be 
assessed as separate product markets which 
are national in character. This, in turn, led to 
the finding that the combination of P&G's 
'Always' brand and the VPS brand, 'Came-
lia' would have created a dominant position 
in the German and Spanish markets for san-
itary pads. At a late stage in the proceedings, 
however, P&G offered to divest the Came-
lia-branded business within a limited period 
following the acquisition of VPS. Underta-
kings given to this effect enabled the Com-
mission ultimately to clear the transaction as 
a whole. Pursuant to the undertakings given 
to the Commission, the Camelia business 
was sold to Kimberly-Clark shortly after the 
Commission's decisions. 
The Shell/Montecatini case was also 
resolved by means of undertakings given by 
the parties to the Commission. The operation 
itself involved the creation of a joint venture 
to which Shell Petroleum (holding company 
of the Royal Dutch Shell group) and Monte-
dison (belonging to the former Ferruzzi 
group) would transfer all their worldwide MERGER REGULATION - 1994 
interests in polyolefins, a family of thermo-
plastics including polyethylene (PE) and 
polypropylene (PP). After investigation, the 
Commission concluded that the joint venture 
raised serious competition concerns which 
centred, in particular, on the market for the 
development and licensing of PP technolo-
gy. This was, in fact, the first time under the 
Merger Regulation that a separate market for 
technology was defined by the Commission. 
The Commission's prime concern stemmed 
from the fact that following the operation 
Shell would have ultimate control over the 
two main and currently competing PP tech-
nologies worldwide, namely, 'Unipol', 
owned by a subsidiary of Shell in partner-
ship with Union Carbide Corporation, and 
'Spheripol', owned by Montedison. To 
resolve this issue, the parties agreed to trans-
fer Montedison's Spheripol technology busi-
ness to a separate company in which Shell 
had no influence and which would therefore 
remain in competition with Unipol. They 
also volunteered that Montedison would 
withdraw from a PP joint venture, which 
alleviated other concerns raised by the Com-
mission in relation to the market for the pro-
duction and sale of PP itself. As a result, the 
Commission was finally able to clear the 
case. The United States antitrust authorities 
have also had concurrent jurisdiction over 
this case and have proposed clearing it on a 
similar basis to the Commission. 
By contrast, in the MSG Media Service case, 
undertakings proffered by the parties were 
not sufficient to change the Commission's 
analysis that the establishment of a joint 
venture between Bertelsmann, Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom and the Kirch group 
would have sealed the German pay-televisi-
on market from foreign competition, thereby 
leaving the parties to dominate the German-
language market. The essential purpose of 
the MSG joint venture was to develop the 
future market for decoders and administra-
tive and technical services for pay-television 
operators in Germany, in particular for Pre-
miere - the only current pay-television chan-
nel in Germany - owned by Kirch and Ber-
telsmann with Canal Plus. In the Commis-
sion's view, the extensive media activities of 
Kirch/Bertelsmann and those of Deutsche 
Telekom, as the owner of most of the cable 
network in Germany, made each of these 
parties the most likely individual entrants 
into this market. Competition from other 
sources, therefore, was unlikely and, in any 
event, MSG would be able to limit competi-
tion from other service providers. In addi-
tion, through the joint venture, Kirch and 
Bertelsmann could control competition on 
the pay-television market in Germany, while 
Deutsche Telekom would be in a position to 
reinforce its dominance on the cable net-
work market. The Commission thus prohib-
ited the establishment of this joint venture 
under the Merger Regulation to ensure, in 
particular, that future markets in the multi-
media sector would remain open to competi-
tion. This is the first time that the Commis-
sion has assessed an operation in a market 
concerning an entirely new product, which 
therefore required the Commission to pay 
particular attention to any potential fore-
closure effects of the operation in question. 
Increased transparency and 
efficiency in implementing the 
Merger Regulation 
Following extensive consultation with repre-
sentatives of industry, the legal profession 
and national authorities, the Commission 
adopted a series of measures designed to 
reduce the reporting burden for certain noti-
fiable operations and also to render Commu-
nity merger control more transparent and 
user-friendly for all concerned. These meas-
ures follow on from the Commission's 1993 
report to the Council on the implementation 
of the Merger Regulation in which the Com-
mission undertook a number of commit-
ments before any formal revision of this 
Regulation. 
A major change for companies is the intro-
duction of a short-form notification option 
available for notifiable joint ventures whose 
turnover and/or assets are below ECU 100 
million. This option is included in a new  43 form CO which has also been modified in 
the light of the Commission's experience 
since the Merger Regulation came into 
force. The value of prenotification discus-
sions with the Commission is expressly reaf-
firmed in the new form since this will gener-
ally enable the Commission to limit the 
amount of information required to be noti-
fied in individual cases. In addition to the 
form itself, the Commission has also taken 
the opportunity to improve the procedural 
Regulation implementing the Merger Regu-
lation which deals with matters relating to 
notifications, time-limits and hearings. 
Another important commitment undertaken 
by the Commission in its 1993 report was to 
carry out a revision of its notice on the dis-
tinction between concentrative and coopera-
tive joint ventures. The Commission's pol-
icy on this difficult, but important, jurisdic-
tional issue has developed considerably 
through its case-law since the Regulation 
came into force, and the notice adopted in 
1990 no longer accurately reflected the 
Commission's practice. As a result, a new 
notice has now been adopted which takes 
account of this case-law and seeks to clarify 
the principles upon which the distinction 
between concentrative and cooperative joint 
ventures is made, while also seeking to 
reduce, as far as possible, the need to ana-
lyse matters of substance for jurisdictional 
purposes. 
The package of measures is completed by 
the adoption of three new notices dealing 
with the other main aspects of jurisdiction 
which determine when and how the Merger 
Regulation may come into play. The guid-
ance provided in these notices (concerning 
the notion of a concentration, the notion of 
undertakings concerned and calculation of 
turnover) essentially confirms the practice 
developed by the Commission over the last 
four years both in the formal decisions 
adopted under the Merger Regulation and in 
the confidential guidance given in prenotifi-
cation discussions. 
Monitoring and evaluation 
The Commission has commissioned outside 
economic consultants to conduct two 'post-
impact studies' to evaluate the development 
of markets in industries in which decisions 
with undertakings have been adopted, 
specifically, in the mineral water market in 
France and Europe and in the European 
nylon fibres market (following the 
Nestle'/Perrier and Du Pont/ICI decisions, 
respectively). These studies should be es-
pecially valuable in helping the Commission 
to gauge the success of the earliest efforts 
in framing remedies and provide guidance 
for future assessments. 
Organization within the 
Merger Task Force 
At the end of the year, the scope of activities 
of the Merger Task Force was enlarged by 
the addition of mergers falling within the 
scope of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC). As a result, the administra-
tion of mergers falling under both EC and 
ECSC jurisdiction (so-called mixed cases) 
will be made easier for all concerned. 
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European Economic Area 
The Agreement on the European Economic 
Area, which entered into force on 1 January 
1994, represents the most ambitious agree-
ment ever concluded with third countries. 
Effectively, it extends the single market to 
all the members of EFTA and assures, for the 
sectors covered, the same degree of econ-
omic integration as within the Community 
itself. As a result, it was decided to imple-
ment fully within the EEA the same compe-
tition rules and policy as apply within the 
Community, necessitating the creation of 
structures and procedures identical, or at 
least parallel, to those of the Community. 
Central and East European countries 
The evolution of the economies of the Cen-
tral and East European countries towards 
market economy systems continued in 1994. 
Effective competition policy is an essential 
element in achieving a successful transition 
and is also a prerequisite for a reduction in 
trade policy measures, as effective competi-
tion policy will erode the economic basis for 
such measures. 
The Europe and Interim Agreements con-
cluded with the Central and East European 
countries contain substantive competition 
rules which are essentially those of the EC 
Treaty. 
The cooperation procedures implemented 
for the rules relating to undertakings cover 
three types of situation: where both compe-
tition authorities have jurisdiction in the 
same case; where only one authority is com-
petent but where its decisions may affect the 
important interests of the party whose 
authority is not concerned; and where a case 
falls outside the scope of either competition 
authority's responsibilities (as, for example, 
where only the competition authority of a 
Member State is competent); these rules are 
in the process of being approved by the 
Association Councils. 
The definition of the implementing rules on 
State aid and their enforcement is a major 
task for the near future. The Agreements 
already contain a general prohibition on the 
granting of State aid while at the same time 
allowing for the application of the 
Article 92(3)(a) derogation. 
In the area of competition policy, consider-
able progress has already been made in 
approximating the relevant national legisla-
tion, in line with the political priorities of the 
EU's pre-accession strategy, although much 
work remains to be done. 
At the European Council meeting in Essen, 
the Commission was specifically charged 
with developing a training programme for 
the Central and East European countries 
drawing both on its own experience and that 
of the Member States, in order to facilitate 
the enforcement of competition policies. 
Baltic States and new independent 
States 
The negotiation of free trade agreements 
with the Baltic States was concluded in 
1994. These agreements contain similar 
competition rules to those of the Europe 
Agreements concluded with the Central and 
East European countries. 
A less stringent set of competition rules was 
included in the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement concluded with Russia in June, 
reflecting the different nature of the links 
established between it and the European 
Union. Similar agreements were signed with 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
1994, and others were recently signed with 
Moldova and initialled with Belarus. 
Mediterranean countries 
Negotiations are also under way for agree-
ments with certain Mediterranean countries,  45 in many respects following the model of the 
agreements concluded with the Central and 
East European countries. 
A customs union with Turkey is also being 
negotiated. Given that customs restrictions 
and trade measures would be abolished, it is 
important to ensure that trade is not distort-
ed through the actions of undertakings them-
selves or through State measures, as, for 
example, the granting of State aid or exclu-
sive rights to undertakings. Hence, a full set 
of competition rules is included in the pro-
posed agreement. 
Pacific countries 
A successful second seminar on EU/Japan 
competition policy was held in September, 
organized jointly by the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission (JFTC) and DG IV. Discussi-
ons at a very high level took place on two 
particular topics, 'Deregulation and enforce-
ment' and 'Vertical restraints and competi-
tion policy'. 
The presence in Brussels of a high-level 
delegation from the JFTC afforded the oppor-
tunity to pursue bilateral contacts on areas 
of common interest. 
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North America 
During 1994, the European Court of Justice 
delivered its judgment on the legality of the 
Commission's conclusion of the Agreement 
with the Government of the United States of 
America on the application of the competi-
tion rules. The Court overturned the conclu-
sion of the Agreement, taking the view that 
it was a matter falling within the Council's 
competence. 
The Agreement remains valid under interna-
tional law. However, steps had to be taken to 
remedy the defect under Community law. 
On 12 October, the Commission adopted a 
communication to the Council proposing 
that the Council approve and conclude the 
Agreement in its original form on behalf of 
the European Community. The Commis-
sion's conclusion remains valid for the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community. At the 
close of the year, the Council was consider-
ing the communication with a view to taking 
a positive decision early in 1995. 
The Commission also put forward a propo-
sal to the Council in 1994 to authorize the 
opening of bilateral negotiations with Cana-
da regarding the conclusion of a Coopera-
tion Agreement in the area of competition. A 
decision in this regard is expected in January 
and negotiations will commence as soon as 
possible thereafter. 
During 1994, relations with Australia and 
New Zealand were further pursued and 
exchanges took place, in particular regard-
ing the rich experience of these two coun-
tries in the area of deregulation. 
Multilateral organizations 
DG IV participated in the work of relevant 
multilateral organizations, in particular the 
OECD's Committee on Competition Law 
and Policy and Unctad's Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts on Restrictive Commercial 
Practices. 
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and its consequences, in particular 
for competition policy, were evaluated dur-
ing 1994. A Commission paper on competi-
tion rules at the international level was dis-
cussed at a meeting of the Council's Article 
113 Committee on Commercial Policy and 
received the broad support of the Mem-
ber States. In the light of this, Commissioner 
Van Miert established a group, comprising 
recognized authorities in the field assisted 
by officials of the European Commission, to 
discuss the prospects for closer international 
cooperation between competition author-
ities. 
The group will draw on the experience of the 
European Union in negotiating and adminis-INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 
tering multilateral and bilateral international blocks' for negotiations on the creation of a 
trade agreements with supplementary com- structure permitting the application of com-
petition rules and also in the unilateral appli- petition rules to global activities. The group 
cation of EU competition law to anticompet- will conclude its work and publish a report 
itive practices in formulating the 'building in 1995. 
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